Previous academic research on the expansion of dominant retailers such as Wal-Mart has looked at implications for incumbent retailers, consumers, and the local community. Little is known, however, about Wal-Mart's influence on suppliers' performance. Manufacturers suggest Wal-Mart uses its power to squeeze their profits. In this paper we study the validity of that claim. We investigate the underlying mechanisms that may cause changes in manufacturer profits following Wal-Mart market entry. Our data contains information on supplier interactions with retail stores, including Wal-Mart, for a period of five years.
Introduction
Wal-Mart, reporting over $400 billion in net sales for 2008 (Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 2009 ), has been ranked the number one non-oil company on the FORTUNE 500 for the past nine years.
As the world's largest retailer Wal-Mart has become the biggest buyer for manufacturers such as Disney, Gillette, Kellogg's, Mattel, Procter & Gamble, and Sarah Lee (Useem 2003) .
Passing-through cost savings and quantity discounts, the low-overhead, low-inventory retailer won the battle for the grocery dollar by offering consumers its (in)famous "Every Day Low Prices".
Although over 200 million people shop at Wal-Mart's 4000+ U.S. locations each year (Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 2008 ), public opinion is not all favorable. Trade unions and special interest groups (e.g., McGee and Festervand 1998, Kinzer 2004) , local politicians (Moreton 2006 , Parsons 2006 , and the media eagerly portray the retailer as a "world-wide chain of exploitation" destroying communities while squeezing its employees and suppliers alike (e.g., Akron Beacon Journal 2000). Its sheer size and power compelled manufacturers to ask whether or not to "... say no to Wal-Mart?" (Bowman 1997) . The demise of Rubbermaid is an often cited example of the retailer's power. When the durable housewares producer, then one of America's most reputable companies, tried to pass-on a cost based price increase, Wal-Mart pulled all Rubbermaid products from its shelves in 1994. As the big-box retailer was Rubbermaid's largest outlet, the manufacturer could not recuperate and was forced to sell-out to Newell several years later. Over 700 suppliers have now built offices close to company headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas in an attempt to strengthen ties with the dominant chain (Fishman 2006) . Previous academic research on discount chains mainly focuses on implications for incumbent retailers (e.g., Stone 1988 , 1995 , Basker 2005 , Gielens et al. 2008 , Ailawadi et al. 2009 ), consumers (e.g., Basker 2005 , Hausman and Leibtag 2005 , Luchs 2008 , and the local community (e.g., Bianchi and Swinney 2004 , Moreton 2006 , Goetz and Rupasingha 2006 , Neumark and Ciccarella 2008 , Halebsky 2009 . Five recent empirical studies on Wal-Mart in marketing and economics emphasize its market entry impact on incumbents and consumers.
First, studying seventeen products in ten categories, Basker (2005) reports a post-entry decline in market prices. Effects for cigarettes, cola, pants, shirts, and underwear are, however, not significant. Singh et al. (2006) -focusing on changes in sales and consumer purchase behavior following one Wal-Mart entry -conclude the incumbent supermarket studied suffers a 17% volume loss, mainly resulting from fewer consumer visits. Interestingly, the authors detect little change in basket size; the number of products bought by the supermarket's loyal customers is comparable to pre-Wal-Mart conditions. Third, Jia (2008) finds that the multinational's expansion in the 1980s and 1990s accounted for a 34% to 41% drop in the number of discount stores. Gielens et al. (2008) Despite discount chains more than doubling their market share since the late 1960s (Jia 2008) , analytical and empirical work analyzing entry implications for manufacturers is scarce and provides inconsistent results. The trade press proclaims suppliers are forced to offer attractive trade deals, merchandise support, and slotting allowances to please powerful retailers (Bloom and Perry 2001) . Although suppliers have reported for years that big-box retailers demand financially-damaging concessions that undermine channel profits (Huey 1998 , Brunn 2006 , current analytical studies provide limited support for a directional hypothesis on how dominant retailers' actions affect supplier performance. Chen (2003) concludes that a dominant retailer's bargaining power reduces a manufacturer's share of joint profits. He theorizes that manufacturers should decrease incumbent wholesale prices, who, in turn, will lower retail prices to boost sales and counter the dominant retailer's rise. Dukes et al. (2006) , on the other hand, suggest that a dominant retailer's power need not diminish supplier profits. The authors argue that suppliers should increase rather than lower wholesale prices charged to incumbents. Their analytical results suggest that while rival retailers may suffer, manufacturers can achieve enhanced performance by leveraging the channel efficiencies the dominant retailer offers. Dukes et al. (2009) study product line decisions in the presence of a dominant retailer.
They argue that incumbent retailers should broaden their assortment when a dominant retailer chooses to stock fewer products. Their analytical results imply that both the size of the incumbents' assortment and its overlap with the dominant retailer's product selection affects their performance. In addition, depending on assortment costs, suppliers may choose to distribute specialty items through incumbents only. Selling to Wal-Mart, which carries a shallow assortment in many categories, will therefore impact manufacturers' profits and product line decisions (Dukes et al. 2009 ).
Even though some authors examine the link between Wal-Mart and supplier performance in an empirical setting, their results are also inconsistent and none of them, to the best of our knowledge, quantifies Wal-Mart entry impact on suppliers. Ailawadi et al. (1995) Gosman and Kohlbeck (2006) , using Compustat and CRSP data, estimate higher gross-margins for Wal-Mart vendors.
In sum, as studies on the costs and benefits for manufacturers of working with WalMart are scarce and inconclusive and empirical research on the impact of Wal-Mart entry on supplier performance is lacking, we propose the following two research questions:
• Does Wal-Mart market entry impact supplier profits?
• What processes drive post-entry profitability changes?
The fact that some retailers do not share data with third parties, such as Nielsen and IRI, is one of the most important reasons empirical work on big-box retailers is still lacking at present. As Wal-Mart has refused to contribute to national consumer sales databases since 2001 (Sachdev 2001) , our study significantly adds to the scarce empirical literature examining the company's impact on suppliers by directly analyzing historical data collected by a vendor. Our unique database contains detailed records on profits, wholesale prices, and shipments for a major consumer packaged goods manufacturer, allowing us to quantify changes in supplier performance following Wal-Mart entry. Our data not only captures the items shipped to each Wal-Mart every week, but also their price. As our dataset spans thousands of retail stores and hundreds of products for a period of five years, we are able to to analyze Wal-Mart entry impact in a broad set of geographical markets while accounting for market structure effects.
As we expect Wal-Mart to strategically choose markets in which to open new stores, controlling for endogeneity in entry decisions is crucial to accurately estimate its impact.
We use propensity score matching to construct a research design of experimental and control markets. Subsequently, we specify a hierarchical Bayesian model to estimate Wal-Mart's entry impact on supplier profits. We use a differences-in-differences format for the first stage model and link entry impact variation to retailer assortment profiles in the second stage (Dukes et al. 2009 ).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We introduce the data and the propensity score method in Section 2 and discuss the hierarchical Bayesian model in Section 4. Section 5 describes our empirical results while Section 6 provides managerial implications.
Data
In this study we use weekly data for a packaged goods category offered by a major manufacturer in the industry. Detailed information is available on supplier profits, wholesale prices, and shipments for over 200 products from December 1999 to January 2005.
1 The data provides complete retail coverage in the U.S. including supermarkets, convenience and drug stores, and mass-merchandisers. Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of the 759
Wal-Mart market entries observed in the data. None of these markets has another Wal-Mart store in the same zip-code area. The number of entries by year are shown in Table 1 .
[Insert Figure 1 wholesale price minus supplier cost of goods times shipments. As an initial estimate of entry impact we calculate the change in weekly supplier profits, wholesale prices, and shipments in pre-versus post-entry periods (see Table 2 ).
% change Supplier profits +22.011% Wholesale prices +6.247% Shipments +13.509% Table 2 : Pre versus post Wal-Mart entry change in weekly supplier profits, wholesale prices, and shipments
Supplier profits increased by 22% on average, shipments to entry markets by nearly 14%, and wholesale prices charged to retailers by just over 6%. Note that the results in Table 2 should be interpreted with caution. For example, demand for the supplier's products might have increased regardless of entry. Since data on the same markets over the same time period but without entry do not exist, we compare outcome data for markets with and without WalMart entry. To the extent that markets with and without entry experience similar changes over time the latter serve as valid controls. For confidentiality reasons numbers are indexed to the value of the outcome measure for non-entry markets before the Wal-Mart entry date Table 3 : Before and after Wal-Mart entry measures of profits, wholesale prices, and shipments for entry and non-entry markets Estimating Wal-Mart entry effects using a differences-in-differences approach controls for changes common to both types of markets (Angrist and Krueger 1999) . Impact estimates on supplier profits, wholesale prices, and shipments, expressed as a percent of the average value in entry markets before are 19% (0.637 / 3.350) , 0.2% (0.003 / 1.037), and 12.6%
(0.399 / 3.172), respectively. As each of these effects is smaller compared to the weekly pre versus post entry changes (Table 2) , particularly wholesale price for which the impact estimate is near zero, the results reported in Table 2 may not be attributable to entry.
Even though these numbers are more reliable than those in Table 2 , they are not without limitations. They have a causal interpretation only if we can reasonably assume that, except for entry, markets with and without entry are comparable. This would imply that WalMart selects entry markets at random. The fact that entry markets appear, on average, to generate much higher supplier profits and shipments suggests such an assumption is highly questionable. If Wal-Mart is strategic in its selection of markets to enter, the results in Table   3 are invalid. Our approach to dealing with potential selection bias is described next.
Selection bias
Matching and Instrumental Variables are two common techniques to correct for selection bias (Angrist and Krueger 1999) . In the context of our study it is difficult to identify instruments that are correlated with Wal-Mart's entry decisions but uncorrelated with supplier outcomes (see Qian 2007 , Gensler et al. 2009 , Tripathi 2009 for similar arguments). Matching replicates a randomized experiment by using covariates to pair experimental (EM) and control markets (CM) (Rubin 2006 , Gensler et al. 2009 ). It ensures that, conditional on covariates, the assignment of markets to the experimental or control condition is independent of market outcomes (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).
Whereas matching on one or a few binary variables is generally straightforward, exact matching on multiple, possibly continuous, variables is infeasible (Angrist and Krueger 1999, Gensler et al. 2009 ). Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is a commonly used method to reduce the dimensionality of the matching problem (Rubin 2006) . Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that if the conditional independence assumption is satisfied by conditioning on Table 4 : Logit estimates for propensity score matching covariates (X), it is also satisfied by conditioning on the propensity score P (X). When the propensity scores for two markets are identical, they are equally likely to receive a treatment because "as far as we can tell from the values of the confounding covariates, a coin was tossed to decide who received treatment 1 and who received treatment 2" (Rubin 2006, p. 448 ).
In our study the propensity score is the probability that Wal-Mart will enter a market given the value of observables. 2 Propensity scores are calculated as the predicted value from a logistic regression with market treatment as the dependent variable (i.e., 1 if Wal-Mart entered a market, 0 otherwise) (Angrist and Krueger 1999) . To minimize selection bias and ensure only relevant covariates are included in the model a stepwise estimation procedure was employed (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984) . Table 4 shows the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the selected variables.
Population size has been used in previous research on Wal-Mart entry (Jia 2008, Zhu and Singh 2009 ). Our estimated non-linear effect suggests entry is less likely for markets with extremely low or extremely high population density. Although Wal-Mart is known to prefer lower income markets (Graff and Ashton 1994 , Moreton 2006 , Vedder and Cox 2006 , Halebsky 2009 ) we find the retailer avoids both the lowest and the highest income markets.
The negative coefficient for age suggests Wal-Mart opts for areas with younger families (see 2 In this study we equate markets to zip-code areas. The coefficient for the Herfindahl index indicates a preference for markets with more but smaller competitors. We also include state fixed-effects to control for unobserved regional differences (Jia 2008) .
It is important to ensure that the distribution of propensity scores for experimental and control markets share a common support to avoid biased estimates (Busse et al. 2006) . Figure   2 shows the propensity score distributions for EM and CM. To achieve common support, we trimmed the dataset using bounds suggested by Gertler and Simcoe (2006), i.e., we excluded
CMs with propensity scores below the 1 st percentile of P (X) for EM and excluded EMs with propensity scores above the 99 th percentile of P (X) for CM. Trimming reduced our sample size to 629 EM and 10,728 CM. Figure 3 shows the adjusted propensity score distributions. After ensuring selected markets lie on the overlapping support of observables, markets with and without entry were paired based on propensity score similarity (Gensler et al. 2009) using nearest available matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985) . The steps in this procedure are as follows: 1) EMs and CMs are listed in random order; 2) when the first EM is matched to the nearest CM based on P (X) both markets are removed from the list; 3) repeat step 2 until every EM is matched. After matching the propensity score distributions of EM and CM are virtually identical (see Figure 4) . Matching each EM with one CM allows us to avoid bias in the estimated treatment effect that may occur when linking multiple, potentially dissimilar, CMs to an EM (Smith 1997) . Moreover, by treating each EM-CM pair as a separate experiment, we are able to investigate variability in entry effects.
[Insert Figure 4 about here] The sample means reported in Table 5 show that experimental and control groups were successfully matched (Rubin 2006) . By using PSM, "the observational study equivalent of randomization in an experiment" (Rubin 2006, p. 461) , our data were transformed into a quasi-experimental design.
Model
We use a hierarchical Bayesian model to estimate Wal-Mart entry effects on supplier performance. Our model provides a differences-in-differences estimator, as extensively used in economics (Angrist and Krueger 1999) and marketing (e.g., Ailawadi et al. 2009 , Tripathi 2009 ). Our dependent variables are supplier profits, wholesale prices, and shipments in week t. For each pair of matched experimental and control markets we have
where i indexes a matched pair of markets i = 1, 2, ...N; e indexes an experimental or control market; t indexes time t = 1, 2, ..., T ; P ROF IT iet is supplier profit; W P iet is the wholesale price charged; SHIP iet is shipment volume; EM ie is an experimental market dummy (1 for a market with entry, 0 otherwise); and W M iet is the Wal-Mart entry dummy (1 if week t is after entry, 0 otherwise). Note that the times series data for the matched experimental and control markets are stacked for estimation. We assume ( 1iet , 2iet , 3iet ) ∼ N(0, Σ i ) for i = 1, 2, ..., N. The coefficients α 3i , β 3i , γ 3i capture the treatment effect (i.e., Wal-Mart entry)
in our before-and-after-with-control-group analysis (Ailawadi et al. 2009 ). Model parameters are allowed to vary across markets. The second stage is given by
where θ i is the vector of parameters in equations (1-3); ∆ = [δ 1 , δ 2 , ..., δ nz ], ξ i ∼ N(0, V θ ); and Z i is an n z × 1 vector of covariates used to capture heterogeneity in entry effects. We explore whether cross-sectional impact differences can be linked to variation in the products offered to, and carried by, incumbent retailers and Wal-Mart. We also include the covariates from the propensity score model in the Z matrix as controls. Additional details on the estimation algorithm are provided in Appendix A.
Results
We estimate equations (1-4) twice: First with data from all retailers in a market combined, including Wal-mart (total market), and again with data from incumbents only (incumbents).
By isolating the impact of entry on, for example, supplier profits generated from incumbents, we are able to investigate a potential source of changes in the outcome metrics for markets as a whole. For example, profits from a market might increase after entry due to a direct boost from Wal-Mart at the expense of profits from incumbents. Providing results for both total markets and incumbents separately provides additional insight into processes affecting supplier performance following entry.
Wal-Mart entry impact
The mean percentage change in manufacturer total market profits is +17.77% (see Table 7) across all markets with Wal-Mart entry; profits from incumbents drop only slightly (-1.34%).
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The supplier studied clearly benefits from the collaboration with Wal-Mart. Compared to the size of Wal-Mart entry effects on manufacturer profits the magnitude of impact on wholesale prices is much smaller. On average, wholesale prices increased only 0.55% and 0.32% for total market and incumbents, respectively. Interestingly, shipments to incumbents drop only 2.52% following entry. When we include Wal-Mart, however, total market shipments increase by 14.95%, on average, which is similar in magnitude to the post-entry profit change mentioned above. As the estimated Wal-Mart entry effects differ substantially from those reported in Table 2 , controlling for selection bias is clearly important in our application. Parameters were converted to percentages for reasons of confidentiality. The magnitudes of entry impact on supplier profits and shipments are intriguing. To ensure these effects are not an artifact of the estimation procedure used we conducted several robustness checks (see Table 7 ). A fixed-effects differences-in-differences estimator was employed to calculate the main effects at the total market level (Angrist and Krueger 1999) . The estimates for profits, wholesale prices, and shipments were 19.01%, 0.32%, and 12.59% respectively; very similar to the results based on matching. We also estimated two differences-in-differences models with alternative matching procedures. First, we used the same covariates in the logit model as reported in Table 4 but estimated the model five times, once for each year in our dataset. Markets were matched based on the parameters of the logit model for the year in which entry occurred. If Wal-Mart's entry strategy changes over time this matching procedure should produce results different from those reported in Table   5 .1. The estimates for profits, wholesale prices, and shipments derived using the 'matching by year' procedure were 17.52%, 0.33%, and 13.91% respectively; again, very similar to our earlier results. Finally, we estimated a matching model with a broader set of covariates including quadratic terms for all variables but excluding state-fixed effects, regardless of statistical significance. Note that we did not use trimming as part of this matching procedure. The estimates for profits, wholesale prices, and shipments from the 'matching without trimming' model were 16.95%, -0.25%, and 15.53% respectively; again, very similar to the results reported in The three scatter plots in Figure 8depict the relationship between supplier profits from Wal-Mart, incumbents, and the total market following entry. The first panel shows the correlation between profits from incumbents and Wal-Mart is limited (r = 0.065), demonstrating that the benefits derived from Wal-Mart's market presence need not come at the expense of profits the manufacturer generates from other retailers. Interestingly, the correlation between profits from Wal-Mart and the total market, shown in the second panel, is not especially strong either (r = 0.361). As Wal-Mart accounts, on average, for 19.19% of total post-entry market profits, this result is surprising. In contrast, the correlation between profits from incumbents and total market, shown in the bottom panel, is very high (r = .954), which suggests maintaining profit levels generated from incumbents is key to the supplier's post-entry performance.
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
We find that Wal-Mart entry can affect wholesale prices charged to incumbent retailers, even though the size of the effect is, on average, small (Table 7) . Table 9 shows the percentage of markets with a significant increase, no significant change, and a significant decrease in wholesale prices. The three scatter plots in Figure 9depict the relationship between supplier shipments to Wal-Mart, incumbents, and the total market following entry. The first panel demonstrates that the correlation between shipments to incumbents and Wal-Mart is negligible (r = −0.011), suggesting limited post-entry cannibalization. Surprisingly, the second panel shows that the correlation between shipments to the total market and profits generated by WalMart is not particularly strong either (r = 0.258). As Wal-Mart accounts, on average, for 18.85% of total market shipments after entry, this effect is surprising. In contrast, the correlation between shipments to incumbents and total market, shown in the bottom panel, is very high (r = .963), demonstrating the importance of maintaining post-entry shipment levels to incumbents.
[Insert Figure 9 about here]
Drivers of post-entry profitability change
As mentioned above, Dukes et al. (2006) argue that manufacturers can boost profits when faced with a dominant retailer by charging higher wholesale prices to incumbents, whereas
Chen (2003) Table 9 show wholesale prices can change, Figure 10 clearly demonstrates they are not the key driver of manufacturer profit changes following Wal-Mart entry.
[Insert Figure 10 about here]
The fact that wholesale prices are, on average, only marginally affected by Wal-Mart entry implies that shipments must be the key driver of the manufacturer profit changes reported in Table 7 . The scatter plot in the left-hand panel of Figure 11 depicts the link between changes in profits and total market shipments following Wal-Mart entry; the one on the right shows the correlation between profit and shipments to incumbent retailers. In Wal-Mart's are vulnerable according to Gielens et al. (2008) . Moreover, Dukes et al. (2009) also suggest that a supplier may choose to sell its specialty items only to incumbents in the presence of a dominant retailer. Even though a dominant retailer will only stock the most popular items to reduce assortment costs, incumbents will benefit from carrying a larger assortment despite the additional cost. In sum, previous research implies that, because WalMart carries a limited selection of goods in most categories (e.g., Stone 1988 , O'Keefe 2002 , incumbents should offer a relatively large assortment focused on products Wal-Mart does not sell. Therefore, we expect that the impact of Wal-Mart entry on supplier profits will be moderated by incumbents' assortment choices. Figure 12 depicts the distribution of assortment overlap between Wal-Mart and incumbents in experimental markets pre-and post-entry. Surprisingly, it seems that incumbent retailers' product assortment becomes more like Wal-Mart's after entry. Since this effect could, at least partly, be explained by changes in the supplier's product line we express the assortment characteristics for experimental markets relative to their matched control market. In fact, our focal supplier's product line contracted by 35% as depicted in Figure 13 .
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We define change in assortment overlap as (op Parameters were converted to percentages for reasons of confidentiality. increases weekly post-entry supplier profits from incumbents by 0.517% and shipments to incumbents by 0.428%. Interestingly, a reduction in overlap has an even stronger impact on supplier profits from the total market. A 1% decrease in overlap increases post-entry supplier total market profits by 0.654% and shipments by 0.543%. This result suggests that increased assortment differentiation does not diminish supplier profits generated by WalMart; to the contrary, it increases them. In addition, even though changes in assortment size are statistically significant, effect sizes are small. A 1% increase in assortment size increases weekly post-entry supplier market profits by 0.039% and shipments by 0.041%.
The impact on profits from and shipments to incumbents are similar in magnitude (0.037% and 0.038% respectively).
Conclusion
In this paper, we study a broad set of geographical markets to determine whether Wal-Mart entry impacts supplier profits and, if so, what processes drive post-entry profitability change.
Our unique database, collected by a Wal-Mart vendor, spans thousands of retail stores and hundreds of products for a period of five years. We employed propensity score matching to control for potential selection bias before analyzing the drivers of profit change: wholesale prices and shipments. A hierarchical Bayesian model was used to quantify the effects of entry and link the results to differences in retailer assortment characteristics across markets.
We find that mean post-entry supplier profit increased by 17.77% for the total market, whereas profits derived from incumbents decreased only marginally. [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] explained: "We want everybody to be selling the same stuff, and we want to compete on a price basis, and they will go broke 5 percent before we will." (Fishman 2006, p. 48, 68) . Trying to beat Wal-Mart at the pricing game is infeasible (Bergdahl 2004) but, as one grocer put it, "They can't beat our price on items they don't have." (O'Keefe 2002) . Retailers selling the same goods as Wal-Mart not only put themselves in jeopardy (e.g., Stone 1995 , Gielens et al. 2008 ), our results demonstrate they also bring down supplier shipments and profits. Increased retail differentiation will not only boost supplier profits from incumbents but, surprisingly, also from Wal-Mart. Therefore, we suggest that suppliers motivate incumbents to diversify, for example, by offering them specialty products, slotting allowances, services, or training that Wal-Mart does not need or want.
Third, to enhance incumbents assortment options manufacturers should maintain product lines. Wal-Mart has become the primary customer for many suppliers, who devote a large chunk of their marketing resources to serve the retailer (Useem 2003 , Fishman 2006 .
Some manufacturers even prune their product lines to better target Wal-Mart's customers (Fishman 2006) , offering incumbents little room to diversify. They are setting up a "loselose" situation, as retailers cannot but carry the same products Wal-Mart does. Just as Wal-Mart continually improves itself by studying its customers buying habits (Huey 1998 ), manufacturers should not only develop and market products for Wal-Mart, but also learn from and cater to incumbent retailers' consumers.
Future research could extend our findings in several ways. For example, while we focus on one major manufacturer in large number of geographical areas in the U.S., researchers could expand our findings to additional industries and countries. Moreover, whereas our study quantifies Wal-Mart entry impact on supplier profits, wholesale prices, and shipments, its implications on incumbent retailer profits have yet to be addressed. Since our results clearly indicate limited cannibalization from incumbents, it would be interesting to investigate the underlying causes of the Wal-Mart entry shipment boost. Is it an income effect? Is the increase driven by a disproportionate change in the demand for products in a specific quality tier? Are incumbent retailers lowering prices for certain products? Furthermore, retailers, suppliers, and consumers may benefit if future studies could determine how retailers can best differentiate their assortments from Wal-Mart.
Wal-Mart's influence on today's global economy is unlike that of any other retailer. Our study provides several new and important insights into Wal-Mart's impact on its suppliers.
We hope that, with manufacturer and retailer cooperation, researchers will be able to paint a comprehensive picture of the costs and benefits for all constituents when Wal-Mart comes to town. 
A Estimation algorithm

